Turkey’s decades-old “Kurdish Question” has recently changed its trajectory. There is a new movie playing in town. The Turkish state is determined to follow a new kind of politics in order to resolve the issues that have been haunting Turkish-Kurdish relations for almost a century. In this commentary, I would like to describe what this new politics looks like.
Let us begin with the question, Why did Prime Minister Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) choose a new and contentious political path? Behind the rationale for this choice lies the collapse of the negotiations initiated by the AKP government with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) – the militant organization that has been party to the Kurdish issue since 1980s – through its jailed leader, Abdullah Öcalan. The period between early 2009 – when the acclaimed “Kurdish opening” was first initiated by the Turkish government – and mid 2011 – when negotiations with the PKK broke down – revealed a gaping chasm between the answer to the questions facing the state (i.e., How can I resolve the Kurdish issue?) and the PKK (How can the Kurdish issue be resolved?). The state seemed to rely too much on Öcalan’s pragmatism and its own naïve perception of Kurdish socialization. The AKP wanted to implement a solution to the Kurdish Question by recognizing Kurdish cultural rights only at the individual level, and by turning a blind eye to the “homecoming” of PKK members. According to this vision of the state: (1) militants would return to their homes and disarm; (2) the Kurdish language would begin to be taught in schools as an elective course; and (3) moderate and religious Kurds would in time be alienated from both the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) – the party that shoulders the parliamentary struggle and campaigns for Kurdish rights – and the PKK. The state thought that the issue would thus gradually disappear. In response to this vision, the PKK insisted that the Kurdish issue should be resolved by a proper “homecoming” that would allow for autonomous rule, education in Kurdish, and official recognition of the PKK as the chief actor of legal Kurdish politics.
The reason why the state chose a new political path regarding the Kurdish issue is due to the failure to bridge this chasm between the AKP and the PKK. Therefore, today’s new kind of politics has been chosen not because the PKK was adamant in demanding that it would “rule Kurdistan.” [Rather, this choice was made] because the state failed to win the PKK over to its formula of “individual cultural rights + homecoming,” because the state deemed it “too risky” to give anything more.
The New Politics
So what does this new politics look like? The new schema – against which the PKK responded with the declaration of a Revolutionary People’s War – cannot be reduced to a simple scheme of “armed conflict instead of negotiations.” Its strategic goal is not to “finish off” the PKK. It is unclear whether the state considers the destruction of PKK technically impossible or politically undesirable, but the actual purpose of the new politics is to pacify and discredit the PKK without causing a civil war. The state does not simply claim, “negotiations failed and now we fight.” Instead, the state is developing a mid-term political strategy based on the combined utilization of military, political, ideological and diplomatic instruments with a novel content.
There is a fundamental, comprehensible reason behind the decision to shape the new politics and its strategic target in this manner: the strong, organic link between the PKK and the Kurdish masses. Because of this strong link, the AKP’s new politics is not based on “direct annihilation” [of the PKK], but instead is performed through refurbished tools. It is well recognized at the state level that as long as this organic link between the PKK and the Kurdish masses continues, absolute destruction [of the PKK] is impossible. It is recognized that an attempt at total destruction would make things worse by moving armed conflict into the cities. It would trigger anti-Kurdish pogroms and lead to an anger that could nourish the PKK. This recognition has apparently led to the following dual decision by the state. First, in order to operationalize the “individual cultural rights + homecoming” formula, the PKK’s role as the most effective actor of Kurdish politics must be nullified. However, this nullification should not be executed abruptly and using only military means. Instead, an amalgamation of renewed military, ideological, political and diplomatic tools should be gradually deployed.
Effective War
The military component of this new politics is renewed by avoiding cross-border campaigns that mobilize thousands of troops, by combating PKK militants using high-tech weaponry and special forces, and by accepting that – in contrast to the criminalizing approach of the 1990s – civilian Kurds are not party to the armed conflict. This military face-lift appears to be compatible with the general strategic objective. It aims to neutralize the PKK without triggering waves of new recruits for the organization and without suffering large-scale troop casualties that may potentially provoke anti-Kurdish pogroms.
Discrediting
The ideological renewal inherent to this new politics is multi-faceted. At one level, a propaganda war is being waged seeking to demonstrate that the members of the PKK and the BDP are incapable of representing moderate and religious Kurds. This campaign is grounded in conservatism and focuses on destroying the reputation of Kurdish politicians by accusing them of being hedonists, sinners, atheists, Zoroastrians, etc. Such relentless and conservative attacks endeavor to alienate the Kurds that approve of the PKK-BDP axis and to cause disgust in Kurds that already disapprove the PKK and the BDP.
At the second level, some ideological attacks originate from democratic grounds. Each day, new volunteers run to these ideological barricades, eager to demonstrate that the PKK, the Union of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK) – a supra-party, grassroots organization founded to implement the Kurdish movement’s principles regarding democratic confederalism – and the BDP are, in terms of their methods of organizing and political programs, primitive and ahistorical. The target audience of this activity is different: (1) democratic and leftist “Turks,” who are not many in number but who still manage to be important and disruptive enough on account of their ability to mobilize in political-intellectual capacities; and (2) middle-class, educated Kurds who are increasingly inclined towards the politics of the PKK-BDP line. The ideological flak against the alleged authoritarian and militarist characteristics of the PKK-BDP axis aims to keep these two groups away from that line of politics.
At the third level, there is a renewal in ideological activity based on nationalist premises. The common nationalist dictum “we shall not allow any territorial schemes on Turkish soil” is now accompanied by a new one: “we gave enough already.” With this new spin, the purpose is to discourage the support by some citizens, who are tired of the thirty-year war, for the demands of Kurdish politics, since such support could potentially increase the self-confidence of the PKK-BDP camp.
Hence, the fundamental objective of this multidimensional renewal in the ideological toolbox is to portray the PKK-BDP line as uncompromising (“we gave them enough already”), as terrorist (archaic, authoritarian), “not one of us, not one of you” (Zoroastrian), and to defame it thus. Although each form of renovation in the instruments of this new politics is significant, its executors care especially about changes in its ideological component.
Amputation
The renewal of the political instrument is also multi-faceted. First, instead of liquidating the non-PKK figures of Kurdish politics or banning parties, a policy of pacification is now being enacted through the police and the judicial systems. This politically crippling operation has been ongoing since 2009 and there appears to be no end to it. The operation has two objectives honed to consolidate the main strategy. The first objective is to prevent the expansion of the PKK-BDP line and to displace its actors as the principal players in Kurdish politics. The second objective is to block the effectiveness of PKK’s Revolutionary People’s War. This second objective is especially important. In the event that the state’s new politics is successful, the PKK is very likely to bring the armed conflict to the cities in the name of the Revolutionary People’s War and to involve the civilian population. Thus, jurdicial operations against the KCK and the BDP aim not only to amputate Kurdish politics, but also to destroy the PKK’s ability to carry the conflict to Turkey’s urban areas.
At the second level of political renewal, changes are being made to the ways in which the politics of the Kurdish Question could be engaged. Some powerful players in conservative Turkish politics, previously appearing to be relatively uninterested in the Kurdish Question, are now taking revisionist (compared to the uncompromising, chauvinistic attitudes of Turkish conservatives towards Kurdish demands in the past) positions. The most significant example is Fethullah Gülen and his followers (an authoritarian Turkish-Sunni “movement” led by wealthy conservatives, who are well-organized both in Turkey and around the world). This immensely powerful group is signaling that Turkey’s conservative elite are ready to accept the respectability of Kurds not only through their religiosity, but also through their language. Such gestures of recognition from the Gülen community towards Turkey’s Kurds reveal that structural barriers that have traditionally immobilized conservatives with regard to the Kurdish political movement are being re-evaluated. This renewal, I believe, is linked to the preparations underway to fill the huge social gap that will be created in Kurdish politics in the event that the plan for the total amputation of the BDP-PKK line succeeds.
This type of conservative reformist gesture creates the impression that responding to Kurdish demands is always kept on the agenda. Maintaining this impression corresponds to a third level of political renewal. The sort of reformism embraced by governmental officials or the conservative elite reinforces the illusion that “we are constantly accomplishing something here.” In other words, paying lip service to the recognition of some of the Kurdish demands and keeping the rights discourse on the agenda, without taking any significant steps, makes the public think that the state is doing all it can. While some make-believe gestures are made, the state is determined to not carry out any reforms regarding the core Kurdish issues like education and autonomous rule. The state has to pretend that it is sincerely engaged in negotiating the demands of the PKK-BDP camp. If the truth about the state’s unwillingness to do anything substantial is publicly exposed, there is the possibility that the exposure will strengthen the hand of the PKK-BDP line.
Finally, the diplomatic instrument is renewed. Though this is to a more limited extent, since there is not much to reform. Basically, diplomatic reform consists of putting an end to the patronizing discourse towards the leaders of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq and trying to neutralize the representatives of the PKK-BDP line in the European Union.
Flaws
This is the new Kurdish movie produced by the state, its new politics to address the Kurdish Question. Doubtless to say, this form of politics is more sober and organized than its predecessor. However, will it work? Will this new politics be able to diminish the power of the PKK and the BDP and resolve the Kurdish Question with its basic formula of recognizing individual cultural rights and amnesty to militants so that they can return to their homes? I believe that accomplishing this is very, very difficult. Let me try to explain.
Largely, the difficulty is related to the vast scale of the mission. To summarize that mission again: weaken and pacify a paramilitary and political movement (PKK-BDP) that has resilient and organic ties with the Kurdish grassroots; to do so, on the one hand, without provoking Kurdish discontent and spreading the conflict to Kurdish cities (Revolutionary People’s War) and, on the other hand, without provoking Turkish discontent and causing anti-Kurdish pogroms (civil war) on the other. That is the objective as I see it and I believe that the renewals just described do not add up to a form of politics capable of achieving this objective. Why? Because each instrument of this new politics, though renewed, is stricken with serious flaws.
Take the military machine. The architects of the reforms at this level think that the old war against the PKK was rigged and ineffective, and that under a new command structure – through the deployment of special forces and the introduction of new military technology – the war can be made effective. For a moment, let us consider the experience of the United States with all that military technology. It looked like that their war toys worked against al-Qaida, but they were not as effective against the Taliban. Now, the PKK looks more like the Taliban than al-Qa`ida. Besides, in the previous “Thirty Years War” against the PKK, military technology must have been modernized countless times. It is unclear how technological modernization that did not work before will work today.
Furthermore, the assumption that “effective war-making can be the end of PKK” neglects the fact that the PKK has already suffered huge losses in its conflict with the Turkish Armed Forces. More than thirty thousand of its militants have perished. Therefore, the state should not need new technology to be effective enough to kill more than thirty thousand militants. In any case, killing militants is not an efficient activity as long as new recruits replace dead combatants. Moreover, I can see no changes in Kurdish sociality and sentiments, which, in the past, enabled PKK to enlist new militants without much difficulty. The new politics currently being spun does not appear to have the power to change the way Kurds socialize, think, and feel about these issues.
There are no fewer flaws in the ideological instrument. At this point, it is extremely difficult to defame the rank-and-file of the PKK-BDP line by telling the Kurds that these organizations are total strangers (religiously, ethnically, etc.) to them. It was attempted in the past to no avail. I think that behind the insistence to discredit the PKK-BDP lays a false assumption. Conservatives and liberals today believe (as did the state elite in the past) that the political leadership of the PKK and the BDP is “distant” from the Kurdish masses, but the opposite is true.
Attempts to alienate “democratic” and “leftist” groups from Kurds are unlikely to work, and if successful, can produce new risks. In case democrats and leftists join the ranks of the nationalist-conservative-liberal-Kemalist bloc against Kurds who are involved in Kurdish politics, this might force Kurds to cut themselves off from the rest of society and turn inwards. Such an outcome would not be in line with the state’s objectives.
On the other hand, some parts of the renovation in the ideological and political levels might prove effective. It is possible that the current ideological campaign against the PKK, labeling it with terrorism, can successfully discredit the organization among Kurds. If military operations against the PKK are executed by isolating the conflict from Kurdish cities and by preventing pogroms against Kurds, and if PKK continues its paramilitary attacks similar to the ones that followed the ambush in Silvan in July 2011 (thirteen Turkish troops and seven guerrillas were killed in the PKK assault in this district of Diyarbakır), the said defamation campaign can indeed be effective.
One of the innovations in the political instrument also appears to be effective. The political messages sent by powerful religious groups like the Gülen Movement that embrace elements of Kurdish culture like the Kurdish language can potentially lead to stronger policy changes. In case such messages encourage significant reforms that meet demands like education in Kurdish, the parliamentary wing of the movement, the BDP, may be weakened. If conservative Kurds within the ranks of the ruling AKP finally stop dragging their feet around the Kurdish Question, the BDP may lose ground. However, I do not expect to witness such developments that can potentially conflict with the state’s current strategy of recognizing individual cultural rights.
Maybe It’s Too Late
Whether the campaign to suppress non-PKK elements of Kurdish politics would deliver the results desired by the state is uncertain. We are now past the second year of the police operations and legal actions against the KCK, and despite this campaign, Kurds have no difficulty replacing neutralized (mainly through prison sentences) political cadres. However, this is not the main indicator to assess the effectiveness of the campaign. In the case that Kurdish cities remain governable once the military campaign against the PKK intensifies, it will be reasonable to argue that the campaign delivered its desired strategic outcomes. A clear evaluation of the effectiveness of the current repression campaign can only be made if the conflict escalates and spreads to the cities.
Despite all its novelties and sobriety, the new politics being deployed to address the Kurdish Question is riddled with deep flaws and is thus very likely to produce risky results. I think that we have to accept the following: today, it is no longer viable to neutralize and discredit the PKK-BDP line without fueling revolutionary people’s war and civil conflict. Attempts to defame and cripple the PKK-BDP line are very likely to lead up to a Revolutionary People’s War or civil war, probably both. What this looming possibility demonstrates is that we need a truly novel politics to address the “Kurdish Question”: we need a new movie.
[A version of this article was published in Turkish in the Daily Star on 14 November 2011. It was translated into Egnlish by Emrah Göker.]